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Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat,
Responding to the Challenge
Alan Dershowitz
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002 (271 pp.)

Reviewed by Russ Weninger†

Alan Dershowitz, in his fascinating book, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge,1 claims that terrorism
can be part of a rational political strategy.2 He argues that Palestinian
terrorism has historically been an example of such rational terrorism.
Dershowitz contrasts this type of terrorism with megalomaniac terrorism, as employed by al-Qaeda. The former is capable of being discouraged, while the latter is not.
Dershowitz argues that since rational terrorism is geared towards
certain political interests, such as Palestinian statehood, it can be discouraged by reacting in a way that decreases the apparent likelihood
that those interests will be satisﬁed. To the extent that this is not done,
terrorism will continue. By way of example, Dershowitz draws upon
correlations between Palestinian hijackings and other terrorist acts on
the one hand, and international recognition of the Palestinian people
and the legitimacy of some of their complaints on the other. Dershowitz
claims that Palestinian terrorism has led to such recognition and has
therefore proven to be a rational strategy for promoting the Palestinian
cause.
The solution is then to react to acts of Palestinian terrorism by denouncing those acts in the international arena and by hindering Palestinian interests in recognition and statehood until such terrorism ceases. As
he puts it:
†
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2
Dershowitz employs a notion of rationality which is arguably different from the common legal
notion of reasonableness. In this notion, behaviour is rational to the extent that it promotes oneʼ’s
subjective interests, whatever those interests may be.
1
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If the cause is just, it should be considered--in the order of its justness
compared with that of other causes, discounted by the penalty that
must be imposed for resorting to terrorism.3

Dershowitzʼ’s treatment of the Palestinian situation is one-sided. The
actions of Israeli soldiers are characterized as being morally superior,
regardless of civilian deaths at their hands, because they apparently do
not directly target innocent civilians, but kill and impoverish civilians
by accident. To the extent that the Palestinian people are complicit in
supporting terrorism, he continues, they are collectively responsible
anyway.
The manner in which Dershowitz correlates Palestinian terrorism
with success for the Palestinian cause is also questionable. Such success includes not only international recognition for their plight, but also
the deaths of the victims of terrorism and the terrorists themselves, as
well as the suffering of the Palestinian people. Since Dershowitz counts
everything as a success, his thesis that Palestinian terrorism has been
successful is trivialized. To be fair, he points out that actual success is
less important, in terms of the continuance of terrorism, than perceived
success. But, for Dershowitz, the perceptions that matter seem to be
those of Machiavellian terrorist leaders hungry for death and publicity.
While, tactically speaking, their perceptions should matter more than
others, from a humanitarian perspective it seems odd to call the Palestinian cause a success, international recognition notwithstanding. Put
another way, Dershowitz sees in the Palestinian people a homogeneity
of interests, and this is used as an excuse to hold Palestinians collectively responsible for the actions of terrorists.
Dershowitz has a different way of dealing with terrorism of the
megalomaniac variety. Such terrorists are motivated by the interests of
achieving martyrdom and happiness in the afterlife. Since it may be difﬁcult to hinder such interests, Dershowitz suggests that those terrorists
must be incapacitated rather than dissuaded, and that recourse to torture
may be necessary. This last claim is deﬁnitely the most controversial.
One does not expect to ﬁnd a proponent of torture among the ranks
of civil libertarians. Nor does one expect an argument which advocates
the use of torture to be reasoned, respectful of the rule of law, and moti3

Supra note 1 at 135.
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vated, to a degree, by compassion. The effect is almost psychedelic. The
legal argument for torture is summed up as follows:
Constitutional democracies are, of course, constrained in
the choices they may lawfully make. The Fifth Amendment
prohibits compelled self-incrimination, which means that
statements elicited by means of torture may not be introduced
into evidence against the defendant who has been tortured.
But if a suspect is given immunity and then tortured into
providing information about a future terrorist act, his privilege
against self-incrimination has not been violated. (Nor would it
be violated if the information were elicited by means of “truth
serum,” as Judge William Webster, the former head of the FBI
and the CIA, has proposed--as long as the information and
its fruits were not used against him in a criminal trial.) Nor
has his right to be free from ʻ‘cruel and unusual punishment,ʼ’
since that provision of the Eighth Amendment has been
interpreted to apply solely to punishment after conviction.
The only constitutional barriers would be the ʻ‘due processʼ’
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which are
quite general and sufﬁciently ﬂexible to permit an argument
that the only process ʻ‘dueʼ’ a terrorist suspected of refusing to
disclose information necessary to prevent a terrorist attack is
the requirement of probable cause and some degree of judicial
supervision. [footnotes omitted]4

Dershowitz admits to a slight wrinkle in the legal argument insofar as
the United States is a signatory to the Geneva Convention Against Torture. However, the United States adopted the convention with the reservation that it would only be bound to the extent that it was consistent
with the Eighth Amendment, and American courts have decided that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of physical force to gather
information necessary to save lives.5
More interesting is Dershowitzʼ’s moral argument for the permissibility of judicially warranted, non-lethal torture. The ﬁrst premise is
that torture sometimes elicits accurate information. Given this fact, torture could possibly be used to prevent terrorist attacks and thereby save
4
5
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lives. Dershowitz then adopts a rule utilitarian approach, which argues
for adopting whatever rules lead to the best consequences overall. The
claim is made that torture will happen anyway, whether being done covertly by law enforcement ofﬁcials or by states who have been sub-contracted as torturers by the United States.
Since torture will happen anyways, and since it can potentially be
used to save lives, the project is to devise rules that will maximize the
good consequences and minimize the bad. The requirement of a judicial
warrant is one such rule. Another is that the method of torture employed
should not cause death or lasting injury. A third requirement is that information acquired as a result of torture should not be admissible in
court against the person tortured. Proposed methods include the use of
a dental drill without anesthetic and the use of a sterilized needle underneath the suspectʼ’s ﬁngernails.
Dershowitz points out that there is prima facie inconsistency in supporting the death penalty, as many Americanʼ’s do, yet not supporting the
use of torture. He also points out that police and prosecutors frequently
resort to what would likely amount to psychological torture when they
threaten suspects with the possibility of prison rape. However, for those
who oppose torture and the death penalty, not to mention threats of sexual assault made by ofﬁcials, there is no inconsistency.
As to the rest of the moral argument, Dershowitz may not have gone
far enough in considering the consequences of torture. He acknowledges
that states, rather than individuals, have historically committed the greatest atrocities. Dershowitz even quotes an Italian ofﬁcial who refused to
torture a suspected kidnapper in the interests of freeing a former prime
minister, because “ʻ‘Italy can survive the loss of Aldo Moro, but it cannot survive the introduction of torture.ʼ’”6 If we are not careful, torture
may be with us long after Islamic terrorist groups cease to operate.
Dershowitz also seems to avoid the really hard cases. What if the
police have a suspect who has knowledge of an attack scheduled to
occur within, say, an hour? To save lives, should the police forego the
formalities of a warrant? Or what if time is not the issue, but rather the
severity of the techniques employed? Someone willing to die for a cause
may be willing to endure being poked with a needle underneath the ﬁngernails. What then? And what if mistakes are made?
5
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Finally, Dershowitz does not acknowledge what torture would do to
the torturers themselves. Good people would likely be psychologically
scarred for life and cruel people would have their sadism compounded.
States, as a rule, should not be involved in the psychological corruption
of their ofﬁcials.
In fact, Dershowitz considers other options besides torture. These
include controlling the media, monitoring all communications, criminalizing the advocacy of terrorism, restricting movement, using collective punishment techniques, engaging in targeted assassinations, staging
pre-emptive attacks, resorting to massive retaliation, conducting secret
military trials, and torturing suspects. Dershowitz suggests that when
evaluating possible responses to terrorism we should balance interests
of security with the values of civil liberty and democratic accountability. On the whole, Dershowitz appears more permissive of espionage
and the use of force than he is of limiting freedom of expression and the
jurisdiction of civilian courts, but even there he rejects absolutism.
Dershowitzʼ’s arguments should be taken seriously. What may be dismissed out of hand in the legal profession and academia as heresy, may
be highly persuasive to the police forces, militaries, and spy agencies of
the world. These arguments may also persuade politicians, policy makers, and the general public. To the extent that we are not happy with that
we should have reasoned counter-arguments. Further, there is presumed
utility in individuals and institutions having as accurate a sense of the
limits of moral permissibility as possible. To the degree that Dershowitz helps us to elucidate those limits, this book should be regarded as a
contribution of value.

